At the Africa Climate Summit 2, the African Union announced plans to convene a coalition of mineral-producing countries to coordinate how the continent manages what it calls a “green minerals” opportunity and the global scramble for the metals that underpin electric vehicles, batteries and renewable energy infrastructure. Framed in the AU’s new African Green Minerals Strategy, the initiative is pitched as a tool for steering mineral wealth toward industrialization, job creation and climate-resilient development rather than continued dependence on raw-commodity exports. The announcement came as heads of state adopted an Addis Ababa Declaration that pairs large finance pledges with demands for African agency in green supply chains.
Global demand for critical minerals is set to surge: the International Energy Agency projects that mineral needs for clean-energy technologies will multiply markedly across scenarios, some metals could see demand double or more by 2040, and other modelling points to a threefold to fourfold increase as the energy transition accelerates. That gap between demand and secure, traceable supply is the hinge on which geopolitics now swings. Beijing currently dominates processing and parts of the upstream chain for many battery metals; Washington and its partners are actively seeking alternate suppliers and partners to reduce strategic vulnerability. African governments say they will use a continental platform to translate commodity rents into industrial capacity and bargaining power.
That ambition collides with reality on two fronts: governance and geopolitics. The Democratic Republic of Congo, home to the world’s largest cobalt output, has shown how quickly policy can shift when governments judge global markets or domestic politics to require intervention. Kinshasa’s recent move to replace a cobalt export ban with a quota system reflects a strategic turn toward greater state control over volumes, pricing and local value capture; firms and foreign states are now operating in an environment where export regimes can change rapidly. At the same time, Washington has intensified outreach to the DRC and other producers, seeking supply agreements that would diversify sources away from established Chinese-dominated chains. Those diplomatic and regulatory manoeuvres illustrate how mineral diplomacy has become a theatre of great-power competition, and why Africa’s own coordination could alter the calculus for external actors.
Beyond headlines about strategic rivalry, the AU’s coalition proposal is meant to address fundamental structural weaknesses that have long blunted the development impact of extractive sectors. Africa’s comparative advantage is not just reserves; it is the potential to process, fabricate and service downstream industries, activities that create jobs, broaden tax bases and reduce vulnerability to commodity cycles. The AU’s strategy explicitly calls for regional cooperation on beneficiation, industrial corridors, public investment in energy and logistics, and new financial instruments tailored to de-risk early-stage processing projects. These are practical levers, but they require credible institutions, sustained capital and rules that lower the risk of capture by entrenched interests.
Sustainability and social risk are the other non-negotiable dimension. Rapid expansion of mining without robust environmental and labour standards has already produced toxic spills, water stress and hazardous artisanal operations across the continent. Independent investigations and monitoring groups have documented water pollution and health impacts around industrial mines in central Africa, while studies in West Africa show sharp increases in mercury and arsenic contamination linked to artisanal gold activity. Child labour, hazardous working conditions and the informal trade in minerals remain embedded problems, especially in conflict-affected zones where governance is weakest. Any continental strategy that does not squarely confront these realities risks exporting instability to the value chains it seeks to join.
Read also: PepsiCo and Unilever launch global regenerative farming drive with lessons for Africa’s food systems
A coalition of producers could, in theory, set minimum standards for traceability, pool resources for downstream infrastructure, and negotiate market access on more equal footing. It could also coordinate fiscal regimes to avoid destructive price wars and provide pooled financing mechanisms for value-adding projects. But such cooperation will only deliver if it is paired with transparency requirements, independent oversight and meaningful engagement of affected communities.
Instruments such as the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) and regional commodity governance frameworks have a role to play here; they can provide the public data that make contracts, revenue flows and beneficial ownership visible to citizens and investors. The AU itself has signaled a willingness to align the Green Minerals Strategy with governance reforms, calling for mechanisms that prioritize adaptation funding and protect communities while supporting industrialization.
There are three practical risks that should trouble policymakers. First, a continental coalition will face heterogenous interests: coastal processors, landlocked producers, artisanal economies and state-owned mining companies each have different priorities. Reaching consensus on quotas, tariffs, and local-processing requirements will be politically fraught. Second, external actors can exploit divisions: rival powers offering conditional finance, security guarantees or infrastructure deals can undercut collective bargaining if governance gaps persist. Third, the environmental externalities of rapid scale-up such as tailings, water extraction, deforestation, could exacerbate local climate vulnerabilities unless mining expansion is deliberately integrated with regional climate adaptation planning. Empirical evidence from recent spills and contamination episodes shows the social and political costs of ignoring these trade-offs.
Read also: Ghana leverages carbon finance to boost agribusiness in historic deal with Singapore
For the AU coalition to be more than a negotiating posture, three policy pivots matter. One, align minerals diplomacy with industrial policy: put measurable targets on local processing, skills development and energy linkages, and create regional hubs where economies of scale lower risk for investors. Two, condition access to incentives and licenses on measurable environmental, labour and transparency standards; leverage existing initiatives like EITI to make compliance auditable and public. Three, reform finance: create blended-finance windows and convertible instruments that accept commodity price volatility, support early-stage plants, and enable pre-competitive investments in logistics and power. These steps will not be quick, but they are essential if mineral wealth is to fund climate resilience rather than fuel new cycles of extraction and exclusion.
The AU’s move also reframes a normative debate: Africa can no longer be only the source of inputs for a green transition conceived elsewhere. António Guterres and other global voices have argued publicly that Africa could be a “renewable superpower” if the continent controls both the raw materials and the industrial capacity that turns those resources into value. However, turning that argument into policy requires a coalition that blends hard bargaining with governance reform, patient finance, and safeguards for communities and ecosystems. If the Addis Ababa declaration yields operational mechanisms – pooled funds, binding standards, and regional processing projects – it will alter how global buyers secure supply. If it does not, the contest for minerals will remain a replay of past patterns: extraction that enriches few and degrades many.
The AU’s proposed coalition is a necessary step; it is not sufficient on its own. The continent’s leverage depends on internal coherence and external credibility. Success will require sustained political leadership, enforceable transparency, and an ability to translate geological advantage into industrial and social outcomes. The risk is not only that Africa’s minerals fuel foreign value chains, but that hurried expansion deepens environmental harm and entrenches inequality, an outcome that would undermine both sustainability and the geopolitical clout the AU now seeks to build. The next test will be whether leaders follow the summit rhetoric with concrete legislation, regional investment vehicles and honest accounting of social and ecological costs.
