More than 1,600 fossil fuel lobbyists gained access to the COP30 climate talks in Belém this year, giving industry representatives a presence that outnumbers every national delegation except that of host country Brazil. Even though COP30 attendance is lower than in previous summit, the tally, equivalent to roughly one in every 25 participants, raises fresh questions about influence, transparency and the ability of the UN process to produce outcomes that protect the world’s most vulnerable.
The finding, compiled by the Kick Big Polluters Out coalition, shows a 12 percent rise in the share of fossil fuel-affiliated participants compared with last year, and adds to a five-year total of some 7,000 industry-linked attendees, a reality that now sits uneasily against growing climate losses, stalled finance pledges and legal scrutiny of fossil expansion.
The KBPO findings come as 2025 is set to become one of the hottest years on record, with climate disasters intensifying worldwide and atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations reaching unprecedented levels. At COP30 the industry’s footprint eclipsed the combined delegation size of the ten most climate-vulnerable nations; fossil fuel passes outnumbered those ten countries by two to one, and outnumbered single-country delegations from the Philippines, Jamaica and Iran by factors of nearly 50, 40 and 44 respectively. That imbalance is not merely symbolic.
“It’s common sense that you cannot solve a problem by giving power to those who caused it.” said Jax Bongon member of Kick Big Polluters Out from IBON International in the Philippines.
Lobbyists circulate behind closed doors, attend side events, join technical meetings and cultivate relationships with negotiators and finance officials. In a negotiating environment where access shapes agenda priorities, the presence of industry actors at this scale alters power dynamics and steers discussion toward market-based or incremental approaches that preserve existing business models.
A line-by-line review of the provisional COP30 participant list reveals lobbyists outnumbering the Philippines’ official delegation by nearly 50 to 1, even as the country confronts back-to-back typhoons. Their presence exceeds Jamaica’s delegation more than 40 times, despite the island still struggling to recover from Hurricane Melissa.
Trade associations continue to serve as key avenues of influence, with the International Emissions Trading Association alone bringing 60 delegates tied to companies such as ExxonMobil, BP and TotalEnergies. Another 599 lobbyists entered through government overflow badges, giving them proximity to closed-door discussions. Several wealthy nations, including France, Japan and Norway, integrated fossil fuel representatives directly into their official delegations, placing industry executives at the heart of the talks.
The timing compounds the problem. States and campaigners are meeting promises made in earlier COPs with faltering follow-through: the $100 billion annual climate finance pledge remains unmet, and since COP29 roughly $250 billion in approvals has been routed to new oil and gas projects.
At the same moment the International Court of Justice has signaled the seriousness of continued fossil expansion by linking large-scale fossil activity to broader obligations under international law. For African negotiators, for whom adaptation and loss-and-damage funding often mean the difference between stabilizing livelihoods and spiraling debt, the presence of well-resourced industry delegations at the negotiating table complicates already difficult talks about who pays and how quickly funds move.
Practical consequences are visible on several fronts. First, financing windows that should prioritize adaptation and resilient infrastructure can be reframed to favor mitigation solutions that are easier to securitize or that rely on offsets and market instruments.
Second, contested policy tools such as carbon markets and certain “nature-based” credits are frequently advanced by industry-aligned actors as scalable solutions, even where independent analysis questions their efficacy for tangible emissions reductions. Third, the very optics of corporate infiltration erode public trust and strengthen demands for stricter conflict-of-interest rules, disclosure and participant vetting, measures the UNFCCC has only partially implemented to date.
Africa’s negotiating position is shaped by these dynamics. Countries on the continent face an urgent financing gap for adaptation, with estimates of annual losses in the billions; they also possess a comparative advantage in renewable energy and green minerals. Turning that advantage into bankable projects requires clear finance instruments, predictable disbursement and a pipeline investors can trust.
Here, regional banks and financiers have an outsized role to play: by designing blended finance mechanisms, underwriting renewables, and providing local-currency debt facilities, institutions can lower perceived risk and attract private capital into green infrastructure. Standard Bank, among others, has been visible in underwriting and advisory roles that connect capital to energy transition outcomes across southern Africa; its participation illustrates how regional financial actors can either catalyze or constrain the shift away from fossil dependence depending on the instruments they prioritize.
The policy challenge for African governments is therefore twofold. They must press for stronger governance of the negotiation space itself, enforceable disclosure, conflict-of-interest rules, and limitations on the roles industry actors can play in formal bargaining processes, while simultaneously building domestic investment frameworks that reduce reliance on external, fossil-friendly capital.
On the ground this means fast-tracking reforms that bundle concessionary finance with accountability clauses, insisting on measurable, time-bound deliverables for adaptation projects, and creating procurement frameworks that favor local content and workforce transition plans.
Civil society and campaign coalitions are already translating the exposure of industry presence into concrete demands. Calls to “kick polluters out” are accompanied by proposals for participant vetting, public registries of sponsors, and legal instruments to prevent revolving-door relationships between industry and negotiators. These proposals will matter only if backed by states prepared to tie summit access to hard rules rather than voluntary codes.
COP30’s industry concentration is a practical test of the UN process. If negotiators allow an environment where companies that profit from fossil extraction continue to enjoy privileged access, then outcomes will likely reflect incrementalism and market fixes rather than the large-scale fiscal transfers and public investments African nations say they need.
Conversely, if governments use their seat at the table to demand procedural integrity, and if regional finance actors steer capital decisively toward renewables and just-transition projects, COP32 and the period between now and 2030 could mark a substantive pivot toward accountable finance and implementation.
