As delegates gathered in Belém for COP30 last week, Brazilian security forces were grappling with a parallel crisis unfolding just beyond the conference halls. In the wider Amazon region, criminal groups have tightened their grip over forests, rivers and remote towns, undermining the very climate commitments being negotiated at the summit. Illegal gold mining, deforestation and cross-border trafficking have created pockets of lawlessness that erode conservation efforts and fuel environmental decline at a scale now impossible to ignore.
The damage is stark. Helicopter patrols fly over landscapes where dense forest has been replaced by pale, contaminated pools left behind by illicit mining. Once-towering trees are stripped out to clear space for prospectors, who use mercury to extract gold from soil and rock. The Comando Vermelho (CV), one of Brazil’s most powerful criminal syndicates, now sits at the center of these activities, controlling supply routes for gold, timber and drugs across large sections of the Amazon.
A recent analysis from Brazil’s intelligence agency, Abin, conducted with the Brazilian Forum for Public Security, identifies illegal mining, organized trafficking and human smuggling as the most severe threats to the region’s ecological stability. The report highlights how the convergence of weak state presence, vast porous borders and soaring international commodity prices has created fertile ground for criminal expansion. In at least 260 municipalities, factions like the CV now exert some degree of influence, with roughly half of those areas effectively under their control.
Even Belém itself, the host city of COP30, is not insulated. DW reports that Investigations by local media reveal that construction crews working on a major electricity substation were ordered to halt work each afternoon after receiving threats linked to the CV.
The intimidation prompted federal authorities to heighten security around energy infrastructure. Residents in several neighborhoods say daily life is governed not by municipal regulations but by instructions circulated through WhatsApp messages from gang leaders. Shopkeepers describe paying protection fees; others speak of a code of silence that suppresses complaints and shields criminal activity.
These dynamics matter for climate policy because they disrupt the institutions meant to enforce environmental rules, regulate land use and support communities facing climate risks. When armed groups step into the vacuum, government agencies cannot manage forests or enforce conservation zones. Deforestation accelerates; rivers become polluted; and local populations lose safe, lawful pathways to earn a living.
The roots of the CV’s expansion reach back more than a decade. Ahead of the 2014 World Cup and the 2016 Olympics, Brazilian authorities launched a major policing effort in Rio de Janeiro’s favelas, deploying units designed to stabilize neighborhoods long dominated by drug gangs.
While the strategy reduced violence in those districts, many gang leaders and foot soldiers scattered, moving into regions with weaker oversight. The Amazon offered both lucrative opportunities and minimal state presence. According to intelligence officials, the network’s growth in the region reached its peak in 2024.
The organization’s history stretches further. Born in the 1970s inside one of Brazil’s most notorious prisons, the CV evolved from an inmate alliance into a sprawling criminal enterprise active across Latin America. Today, its influence spans the cocaine trade, illegal mining, logging and smuggling networks, a diversification that gives it financial resilience and strategic mobility. Brazilian lawmakers, alarmed by the scale of its reach, have launched a parliamentary commission to investigate how criminal networks have penetrated political and social institutions.
The timing of this crisis could not be more troubling. Scientists warn that parts of the Amazon may be nearing an ecological tipping point beyond which large tracts of forest may struggle to regenerate. Illegal mining accelerates this trajectory. Mercury contamination enters rivers, poisoning fish populations and affecting communities who depend on them. Deforestation associated with organized crime contributes to rising carbon emissions that undermine global progress toward climate targets. In the absence of effective governance, criminal economies can erase gains made by conservation programmes and climate funding.
These challenges resonate well beyond Brazil. Countries with extensive forest cover or remote mineral-rich regions often face similar pressures. In places where the state’s reach is limited, illicit extraction, illegal logging and cross-border trafficking thrive. Local authorities trying to enforce environmental regulations find themselves outmatched by groups with deeper resources and greater mobility.
Belém’s experience illustrates how quickly criminal activity can intersect with climate action. Even as diplomats debated the future of global adaptation targets, the city hosting them was contending with threats to its electricity grid from a syndicate whose operations directly undermine environmental stability. It is a reminder that climate negotiations cannot exist in isolation from the governance failures that weaken ecosystems on the ground.
For Africa, the parallels are direct. The Congo Basin; the world’s second-largest tropical forest, loses more than 1.3 million hectares annually, with illegal logging responsible for a major portion of the decline. Wildlife crime across East and Southern Africa costs governments an estimated USD 7–12 billion a year, weakening conservation budgets and undermining rural livelihoods. In West Africa, illicit fishing has depleted local stocks, threatening food security for millions.
Many African countries entering COP30 negotiations argue that climate financing cannot succeed without confronting these criminal economies. Local enforcement agencies often lack the resources to police remote forests and waterways. In the DRC and CAR, for instance, conservation patrols face armed groups that profit from timber and mineral extraction. In Liberia and Sierra Leone, border officers struggle to track the flow of illegally traded gold that leaves the region through informal channels.
Read also: Africa eyes billions from COP30’s Tropical Forests Forever Facility to protect Congo Basin
Brazil’s government has responded with heightened security deployments during COP30, mirroring operations mounted during the G20 and BRICS summits. But long-term progress will depend on rebuilding state presence in areas where criminal factions operate with near autonomy. Without that, conservation strategies remain fragile, climate funding leaks into illicit economies, and communities remain vulnerable to exploitation.
What is happening in the Amazon is is a warning about what happens when environmental protection is left defenseless. Criminal networks adapt faster than most institutions and thrive in regions where oversight is thin. Their operations shape land use, alter river systems and destabilize communities far more quickly than policy discussions can respond.
As COP30 enters its final phase, the events in Belém underscore a critical reality: climate goals cannot be achieved if criminal actors continue to dictate the future of the world’s most important ecosystems. For Africa, the lesson from Belém is not simply about Brazil’s internal security problems. It is about understanding how criminal networks have become part of the climate story. They shape land-use patterns, fuel deforestation, distort resource markets and complicate every attempt to build sustainable economies.
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