Niger’s military government has seized control of the Samira Hill gold mine, the country’s only industrial-scale gold operation, in a move that reflects two converging forces shaping Africa’s extractive industries: West Africa’s growing wave of resource nationalism and the continent-wide drive to capture more value from its mineral wealth.
The junta, led by General Abdourahamane Tiani, accused the mine’s Australian operator, McKinel Resources, of “serious breaches” that had pushed the operation into what it called an “alarming economic situation.” According to the government, McKinel failed to honour a promised US $10 million investment plan, resulting in wage and tax arrears, mounting debt, and repeated production stoppages.
Samira Hill’s output has dwindled sharply. In 2023, the mine produced just 177 kilograms of gold—less than a tenth of the 2.2 tonnes generated by Niger’s largely informal artisanal miners, who often work without safety equipment or environmental safeguards.
Security challenges have deepened the mine’s troubles. In May, a roadside bomb in the Tillabéri region, a hotspot for jihadist activity, killed eight mine workers and triggered the deployment of over 2,000 soldiers to secure the site and surrounding transport routes. The area sits in the volatile tri-border zone with Mali and Burkina Faso, a region where industrial mining has long been hindered by insurgency and banditry.
This is not Niger’s first high-profile resource takeover in 2025. In June, the government nationalised the local uranium operations of French mining giant Orano. Together, the gold and uranium moves mark a strategic shift toward reclaiming control over high-value resources from foreign operators.
It’s a shift mirrored in neighbouring states. Since military coups in Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso, juntas have pushed for higher state participation, stricter local-content rules, and contract renegotiations. Mali’s revised mining code allows the state and local investors to hold up to 35% of new projects, while Burkina Faso has tightened oversight of its gold industry. Guinea has demanded more domestic benefits from its bauxite producers. Yet Niger stands out for its readiness to move beyond renegotiation to outright nationalisation.
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The Samira Hill takeover is not just about operational control—it could position Niger to participate in a broader continental shift: moving from raw mineral exports toward beneficiation and value addition.
Under the African Mining Vision (AMV), adopted by the African Union in 2009, beneficiation is seen as a cornerstone of Africa’s industrialisation. In gold, that means moving up the value chain into refining, jewellery manufacturing, and other downstream activities that keep more wealth and jobs on the continent.
Several African countries have already acted. Tanzania requires domestic mineral refining before export. Zimbabwe has banned raw lithium exports and is considering similar measures for gold. South Africa’s Mineral Beneficiation Strategy promotes in-country processing and fabrication. Ghana, Africa’s top gold producer, operates the Precious Minerals Marketing Corporation to strengthen domestic refining and hallmarking.
By controlling Samira Hill, Niger gains leverage to decide where and how its gold is processed. It could mandate in-country refining or partner with regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) facilities, keeping more value in West Africa rather than shipping semi-processed doré bars abroad.
Beneficiation could transform state revenues, especially with gold prices hovering around US $3,500 per ounce in 2025. Even a modest slice of downstream value could fund infrastructure, social programmes, and industrial capacity. Linking Samira Hill’s output to a regional refinery could also strengthen West Africa’s collective bargaining power in global markets.
Yet the path is fraught with challenges. Security instability in the Sahel makes large-scale industrial investments risky. Refining plants require steady power, secure logistics, skilled labour, and long-term policy certainty—all in short supply in conflict-affected regions. Nationalisation without transparent governance risks deterring the very partners Niger would need to build processing capacity.
Another hurdle is artisanal mining, which dominates Niger’s gold production but often operates outside formal supply chains. Without integrating artisanal output into regulated channels, much of the country’s gold will continue to exit through informal routes, bypassing both refineries and the tax base.
The takeover of Samira Hill could become a landmark case in how sovereign control over resources is used. Managed well, it could help Niger align with the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) by boosting intra-African trade in value-added goods, building regional supply chains, and reducing dependence on raw exports. Managed poorly, it risks becoming a political gesture with little impact on national development—gold still leaving unprocessed, revenues stagnant, and communities no better off.
In an era of record gold prices, rising demands for local value capture, and intensifying global scrutiny over supply-chain ethics, the answers will determine whether Niger’s bold nationalisation move becomes a springboard for transformation—or a cautionary tale in the politics of resource nationalism.
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